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Towards a New Political Economy of Behavioral Public Policy
Abstract: The dominant normative framework in behavioral public policy postulates paternalistic intervention 
to increase individual utility, epitomized by the so-called nudge approach. In this article, an alternative political 
economy of behavioral public policy is proposed that sits within, or at least closely aside, the liberal economic tradition. 
In short, rather than impose utility maximization as the normative ideal, this framework proposes that policy makers 
provide an environment that is conducive to each person’s own conception of a flourishing life, while at the same time 
regulating against behaviorally informed harms and for behaviorally induced, otherwise forgone, benefits.
B
ehavioral public policy is the application of 
insights from behavioral economics specifically 
and behavioral science more broadly to 
public policy design. It is, in any substantive sense, a 
relatively recent endeavor, although several decades 
of social science scholarship underpin the approach 
(for recent accounts of the development of the field, 
see Oliver 2017; Thaler 2015). Several conceptual 
behavioral public policy frameworks now exist. Some 
of these approaches aim to educate—to “boost”—
people about their possible behavioral biases so that 
they may make more savvy decisions (Gigerenzer 
2015; Hertwig 2017), and others call for people to 
engage in more deliberative decision-making—to 
think more for themselves—so as to minimize 
reflexive errors (John et al. 2011). Some frameworks 
instead aim to influence automatic decision-making 
without appealing directly to deliberation while also 
retaining the notion of liberty (Thaler and Sunstein 
2003), whereas still others allow heavy doses of 
regulation and even bans (Conly 2013). Some focus 
on improving the well-being of those that the policy 
interventions target specifically, whereas others look 
toward reducing harms to, and increasing benefits for, 
others (Oliver 2015).
The dominant framework in behavioral public 
policy to date, however, focuses paternalistically on 
internalities—that is, it aims to change the behaviors 
of those targeted for their own benefit—and where 
the normative goal is to improve welfare, utility, or 
happiness, an approach epitomized by libertarian 
paternalism, applications of which are known as 
“nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2008). In this 
article, I challenge whether, in relation to influencing 
the behavior of responsible adults, this ought to 
be the principal normative approach—that is, the 
political economic framework—that shapes the 
future of the field. Rather, I argue for a behavioral 
public policy framework that sits within the liberal 
economic tradition of, for example, John Stuart Mill 
([1859] 1972), although compared with others in this 
tradition, the approach posited here aims to tackle 
more forcefully behaviorally informed harms.
The Paternalistic Embrace
As intimated earlier, libertarian paternalism has 
been by far the most prominent framework in the 
behavioral public policy discourse. Like its close 
cousin asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003), 
libertarian paternalism is an approach that seeks 
to guide people’s behavior in particular directions 
without the use of force or mandates. People are free 
to continue with their existing behaviors if they wish; 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) contend 
that retaining freedom of choice is the best safeguard 
against any misguided policy interventions.
Behavioral economists have observed that many 
people are guided by particular behavioral influences 
that appear almost innate, including, for instance, 
loss aversion (i.e., the heavier weight that people 
attach to losses than to gains of the same magnitude) 
and present bias (i.e., the heavy emphasis that 
people place on the immediate moment) (for a 
review, see Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). These 
influences conflict with the assumptions of standard 
neoclassical economic theory and rational choice 
theory. Underpinning libertarian paternalism is the 
assumption that of the many quick and automatic 
decisions that people make each day—decisions that 
are invariably guided by these behavioral influences—
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some will lead to actions that if people deliberated a little more, they 
would not take. The core idea in libertarian paternalism is that with 
knowledge of the behavioral influences, the context or environment, 
or what Thaler and Sunstein (2008) term the “choice architecture,” 
that people face can be redesigned such that their automatic 
decisions better align with their deliberative preferences. In short, 
for a policy intervention to meet the requirements of libertarian 
paternalism—that is, for it to be a nudge—it has to be liberty 
preserving, target internalities, and be informed by behavioral 
science. Each of these three requirements is represented by an axis in 
figure 1 (see Oliver 2015).
Movement toward the origin on the vertical axis in the figure 
indicates that a policy is increasingly liberty preserving rather than 
regulatory. Similarly, movements toward the origin on the horizontal 
axis and on the diagonal axis, respectively, indicate that a policy is 
increasingly addressing internalities rather than externalities, and 
increasingly informed by behavioral science rather than economic 
rationality. Consequently, a pure nudge is represented by the point 
where the axes intersect (i.e., the origin). Examples of pure nudges 
include placing apples at the front and cheesecake at the back of 
canteen shelves, painting green footsteps that lead to refuse bins 
on pedestrian pavements (assuming, of course, that those targeted 
for behavioral change, upon deliberation, would prefer to dispose 
of their litter more responsibly), and by appealing to loss aversion, 
allowing people to deposit money into accounts when they attempt 
to quit smoking on the understanding that the money will be 
returned to them if their abstinence is maintained beyond, say, six 
months.
Some maintain that soft forms of paternalism do not go far 
enough—that respecting liberty ultimately means that these policy 
interventions will be insufficiently effective at addressing the actions 
of those who threaten, for example, their own health and financial 
well-being (Conly 2013). Followers of this point of view tend to call 
instead for a harder, coercive form of paternalism. Although they 
acknowledge that self-harming activities such as smoking may well 
be driven by behavioral phenomena (e.g., present bias), the ends of 
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Figure 1 The Requirements of Libertarian Paternalism
these activities are, they contend, so self-evidently bad that they call 
for the activities to be banned on the demand side.
As intimated earlier, however, paternalism—soft or hard—is 
open to the critique that it unreasonably infantilizes the adults it 
targets and that policy makers ought to have no role—beyond an 
openly educative one (which I strongly support)—in influencing 
the behaviors of those of sound mind if their activities impose 
no ill effects on others, a view akin to Mill’s ([1859] 1972) harm 
principle. A counterargument offered by libertarian paternalists 
and those whom Robert Sudgen (2018) more broadly defines 
as behavioral welfare economists is based on their retaining the 
normative postulate that people should seek to maximize utility. 
They contend that the behavioral influences will sometimes cause 
people to fail to act and choose in their own best interests (i.e., 
to maximize utility). Therefore, following this line of reasoning, 
libertarian paternalists claim that it is legitimate for policy makers 
to steer people in the normative direction of utility maximization. 
But one can question whether this normative direction is, in itself, 
legitimate.
The View from Nowhere
As noted, rational choice theory, standard economic theory, and 
behavioral welfare economics all postulate that people ought to 
maximize utility, which is treated here as synonymous with welfare 
or happiness. Utilitarianism thus has a prominent place in the 
intellectual origins of all of these approaches. The widely accepted 
founding father of British utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, believed 
that humankind is governed by what he referred to as the “sovereign 
masters of pain,” which we seek to minimize, and pleasure, which 
we seek to maximize (Bentham [1781] 1988). Pain and pleasure, 
he contended, are feelings that are experienced on a continuum, 
and thus they can be compared—they guide us on what we ought 
to do and on what we shall do. From this, he derived his famous 
dictum that the societal objective ought to be to achieve the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, most economists and 
philosophers had resigned themselves to the view that measures 
of Benthamite cardinal utility—that is, numerical interpersonally 
comparable indicators of how much pain and pleasure individuals 
experience in the moment—are impossible to uncover. Nonetheless, 
modern neoclassical economic theory, which is based on decisions 
about future experiences rather than experiences in the moment, 
retained the notion that people ought to, and will want to, 
maximize their utility. Therefore, aside from allowing for random 
errors, we can infer that the decisions people make about future 
episodes, and their retrospective assessments of their previous 
courses of action, will be consistent with maximizing the amount 
of utility that they can expect to experience or have experienced. 
There is now evidence to suggest that this inference is sometimes 
erroneous.
This evidence, which began to emerge in the early 1990s, shows that 
when people are asked for their retrospective assessments of different 
events, there is a tendency for their relative preferences to differ 
systematically—that is, nonrandomly—from those predicted by 
utility maximization through a simple aggregation of the moment-
to-moment instant utilities as each event is experienced (for a review, 
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see Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997). Similar observations have 
been made with respect to prospective evaluations and expected 
experienced utility. These systematic discrepancies are attributable 
to factors known as the gestalt characteristics, which are the aspects 
of an event that respondents perceive as salient, and they include 
the tendency for people to prefer worse outcomes to precede better 
outcomes rather than vice versa (Loewenstein and Prelic 1993); an 
aversion to sudden, steep rates of change in outcomes (Hsee and 
Abelson 1991); and, most significantly, the tendency for people to 
place a heavy emphasis on the best, worst (the peaks and troughs), 
and end moments of an episode (Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993). 
This last gestalt characteristic is called peak-end evaluation, and it 
can cause people to underemphasize the duration of the event.
Given that the gestalt characteristics are quite pervasive influences on 
human decision-making, it is likely that they have an evolutionary 
explanation. For instance, the drive for survival in the moment 
might explain the heavy emphasis that is attached to troughs, and 
the urge to flourish perhaps partly explains a preference for episodes 
to improve and to end well. To illustrate peak-end evaluation 
with two of the most striking examples of the effect, let us first 
consider evidence reported by Donald Redelmeier and Daniel 
Kahneman (1996), in which sigmoidoscopy and lithotripsy patients 
recorded their feelings of discomfort every 60 seconds during 
their procedures. These were measures of their moments of instant 
disutility, and by aggregating these moments at the end of the 
procedures, the authors were able to calculate the total experienced 
disutility of the procedure for each patient. The duration of these 
procedures varied considerably across patients, from just a few 
minutes to about an hour. Following their procedures, the patients’ 
retrospective evaluations of the total discomfort that they felt was 
also recorded on a 10-point scale. The authors reported that the 
peak-end effect and duration neglect were observed strongly in the 
retrospective evaluations, and that the retrospective evaluations did 
not correlate with total experienced disutility.
In a continuation of this line of research, Redelmeier, Joel Piano 
Katz, and Kahneman (2003) divided a further 682 sigmoidoscopy 
patients into two groups. Unbeknown to the patients, the tube 
was left inserted inside those in one of the groups for an additional 
short period at the end of their procedures for no clinical reason, 
causing some additional physical discomfort, albeit of lesser 
intensity than when the procedure was ongoing. Instant disutility 
and retrospective assessment were recorded similarly to that reported 
by Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996). In addition to peak-end 
evaluation and duration neglect again being observed, the group for 
whom the instrument was left inserted for longer than was clinically 
necessary generally tended to remember the overall procedure as 
less painful than those for whom the instrument was removed, 
on average, sooner. That the former group must have experienced 
greater total experienced disutility as a consequence of having the 
procedure duration extended unnecessarily means that the authors 
recorded a violation of (utility-based) dominance: in other words, 
the unambiguously worse experience in terms of total experienced 
disutility tended to be remembered as less bad than an experience 
that caused less aggregate pain.
Thus, the gestalt characteristics can cause people to assess options 
in a manner that conflicts with the assumption of experienced 
utility maximization. This begs the question of whether people who 
succumb to the gestalts are making errors of judgment, or whether 
these characteristics are legitimate influences on their preferences 
that ought to be respected. If one assumes that the normative 
assumption of utility maximization that is embedded in standard 
economic theory and behavioral welfare economics aligns with 
the Benthamite notion of utility (i.e., pleasure and pain), then the 
adherents of both of these schools of thought would presumably 
view the gestalt influences as errors.
The prominent neo-Benthamite Richard Layard (2005) expresses 
the view that to avoid inconsistency across policy actions, all laws 
and all rules of morality must be based on a single underlying 
principle, which he, following his intellectual hero, believes ought 
to be to secure the greatest overall happiness within any population. 
Since retrospective and prospective evaluations are unreliable 
indicators of experienced utility, Layard and his followers distrust 
preferences that are elicited with these methods and propose instead 
a variety of alternatives that are meant to measure utility in the 
moment, including sliding scales and knobs that people can move 
to record their continuous mood, asking respondents to record 
their mood every minute or so, and the so-called day reconstruction 
method, in which participants are required to record their current 
mood and their activities periodically during the day.
Daniel Hausman (2015) notes that neo-Benthamism has drawn 
serious interest from several governments, but he identifies some 
problems with this approach, not least in relation to the way in 
which many of its advocates measure experienced utility and their 
claims that these measures have policy relevance. For example, 
Hausman contends that the evidential connection between a 
person’s mood in the moment and how well his or her life is 
objectively going in relation to his or her health, educational 
achievement, financial security, or any other policy consideration 
is weak. Adaptation to a poor state of affairs—for instance, to 
objectively defined harms imposed on a person by another party—
implies that this state will not impact substantially on mood, and 
yet if the poor state falls within the purview of public policy, then 
presumably policy makers would want to address it.
The view that adaptation undermines subjective assessment as a 
means to inform public policy is reflected in Amartya Sen’s (1999) 
notion of a happy slave. That is, few might choose to be a slave even 
if it were known and accepted that one would adapt well to that 
state, because self-determination and the opportunity to flourish 
as one chooses would be substantively—and objectively—curtailed 
as a consequence. The flip side of underestimating one’s plight is 
exaggerating it, which can happen, according to Hausman, when 
transitory states seem more important to people in the moment 
than a more dispassionate, more objective assessment might view 
them to be.
An even stronger criticism of the neo-Benthamite approach, 
however, relates to its proposal to guide policy with an aggregation 
of the moments of instant utility. The contention, summarized by 
Hausman, is that “a good life is not a sum of the net goodness of its 
moments … The same sum of momentary experiences can add up 
to a wonderful life or an incoherent and mediocre one, depending 
on how the experiences are ordered and what overall narrative they 
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sustain” (2015, 114). David Hume ([1777] 1983) earlier made a 
similar point in relation to the value of a life using an analogy of 
how a building cannot be valued by summing independently the 
values that one would place on, for example, its roof, windows, 
doorway, and portico without considering how these components 
fit together. Earlier still, Aristotle ([350 BCE] 1998) noted that 
happiness cannot be assessed by a feeling or sensation in the 
moment, but can only be seen through the quality of a whole life.
Thus, when we look forward to an episode or reflect back on it, 
whether it be a quite fleeting experience (e.g., watching a film), 
a more extended one (e.g., a summer holiday), a more extended 
one still (e.g., our university years), or even our whole life (or, 
if looking forward, what remains of it), the gestalts may matter 
because they give meaning to the story. In remembering, a focus 
on these characteristics perhaps aids a deep desire to identify 
where and when the peaks occurred, how severe the troughs were 
(perhaps many of us would wish to trade off some total utility 
to avoid volatility), whether the experience ended well or badly, 
whether things improved or got worse, and how quickly they 
got better or worse (for prospective assessments of future events, 
the tense in this sentence can be altered accordingly). Following 
this line of argument, particular experiences in an event and how 
certain experiences fit together, and not the simple aggregation of 
everything, gives the event—or a life—its meaning. They partly 
determine how fulfilling the event was to a person and whether the 
person feels he or she had, or will have, the opportunity to flourish.
Prospective and retrospective evaluations might therefore give a 
more accurate—that is, more objective—assessment of the impact 
that a whole experience has had on a person than aggregating the 
momentary instant utilities because they allow the person to step 
out of the experience and offer a better view of how good or bad 
it really was in terms of its positive or negative contribution to a 
flourishing and fulfilling life. To give a concrete example, perhaps 
people tend to remember the peak moments of rearing children, 
because an integral of all of the moments of instant utility might 
make the proposition of repeating the experience somewhat 
unattractive. Hausman (2015) writes that he hardly remembers 
the tedious moments when caring for his children, but he vividly 
remembers the joy of reading to them and thus implicitly aligns 
well-being with fulfillment, not with moment-by-moment (un)
happiness.
There are, of course, many within the economics profession who 
would contend that the focus of the gestalts, and the concern 
with how the moments of an experience fit together, can be 
encapsulated by adding arguments to the utility function (see, 
e.g., Binmore 2005). If one accepts this contention, then the 
gestalt characteristics, although challenging Benthamite utility 
maximization in retrospective and prospective evaluations, do not 
necessarily conflict with broader definitions of utility maximization. 
However, potentially placing anything and everything in the utility 
function leads to a somewhat empty theoretical framework, in 
that utility maximization can then be used to justify all actions 
and choices, and no specific predictions or policy advices are 
forthcoming. That is, whatever a person does can be attributed to 
maximizing utility, which, so the argument goes, is what he or she 
ought to do, so let’s leave it at that.
It is, of course, possible that a focus on the gestalts maximizes overall 
utility for some people; for others, this focus, as well as other choices, 
actions, and behaviors that they undertake in life, could be driven 
by other considerations. They may trade off utility, for instance, 
to feel that their life has meaning or fulfillment of some kind. We 
cannot know what generally drives human decisions and behavior. 
People probably have various and varied legitimate reasons for their 
actions, both interpersonally and, across contexts, intrapersonally, 
and to assume that utility maximization is the appropriate universal 
normative requirement is, as proclaimed by Sugden (2018), a view 
from nowhere. Rather than utility maximization, we may thus 
conjecture that facilitating the drive for fulfillment, meaning, and a 
flourishing life as each individual sees fit is the appropriate normative 
goal. Consequently, the role of policy makers is to secure an 
environment that helps people to flourish—for them (i.e., the people) 
to pursue meaning and fulfillment to and in their lives as they see fit, 
subject to public resource constraints and distributional concerns.
Nourishing Flourishing
If the purpose of policy makers is to help create the conditions for 
people to flourish as they see fit, then encouraging reciprocity—in 
short, the act of returning a favor with a favor and a harm with 
punishment—as an aspect of behavioral public policy (in that it 
conflicts with the assumption embedded in rational choice theory 
that people are egoistically selfish in their pursuit of utility) is 
potentially an important arm of this effort. Reciprocity has evolved 
as a central social norm in all known cultures because it confers 
benefits on the group and, through an enlightened form of self-
interest, to most of the individuals within each group. There are, 
of course, many possible negative consequences of reciprocity—for 
example, its potential to breed resentment, retaliation, retribution, 
cronyism, fundamentalism, nationalism, and the like—but 
with care, reciprocal actions can serve as a force for individuals 
and groups of people to more effectively reach their preferred 
destinations. Unfortunately, unless care is taken in societal and 
institutional design, reciprocity as a motivator of human behavior 
can be crowded out by our baser instincts.
There is a vast multidisciplinary literature on reciprocity, and this is 
starting to filter through to the public policy discourse, with recent 
books related to the topic published by, for example, David Sloan 
Wilson (2015) and Samuel Bowles (2016). A detailed exposition 
of the importance of reciprocity and how it might be nurtured 
by policy makers is offered elsewhere (Oliver 2019), but it may 
include encouraging those with policy influence to emphasize the 
importance of this motivator of human behavior in their rhetoric, 
decentralizing decision-making, and ensuring that income and 
wealth are not concentrated excessively in the hands of a small 
proportion of the population. Let us briefly consider these three 
general structural features.
On the importance of emphasizing reciprocity in the policy 
rhetoric, the underlying messages to “give so as to receive” and 
to “give to those who have given” are likely to be useful to policy 
makers, not only in gaining support for policies that they wish to 
introduce, but also to strengthen an aspect of human motivation 
that can underpin the collective good. If we take health or social 
care insurance, for example, we might emphasize to relatively young, 
healthy people that they contribute toward the costs of people in 
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need of these services now so that they (and those they care about) 
will benefit in the future.
It is not wise to appeal to pure altruism to construct and sustain 
a welfare system, since pure altruism is not, for most people, a 
sustained source of motivation, and it is imprudent to appeal to 
egoism, because egoism, if encouraged, may thrive and harm. If 
policy makers wish to create new and protect old institutions, they 
might sensibly work hard to convince those who finance those 
systems—systems that substantially benefit “others”—benefit them 
also. “If some users get all of the benefits and pay few of the costs,” 
writes Elinor Ostrom (2000, 150), “others become unwilling to 
follow rules over time.” Moreover, by appealing to this notion of 
give-and-take, policy makers are likely to strengthen the social norm 
of reciprocal altruism, which bodes well for the more widespread 
collective benefits that a group may accrue by holding true to this 
substantively prosocial sentiment.
With respect to decentralizing decision-making, in The Logic of 
Collective Action, Mancur Olson (1965) argues that large groups 
will not be able to organize themselves voluntarily for coordinated 
and cooperative action, even if they have good reason for doing so. 
This is partly because the more people there are to share a collective 
benefit, the less each individual can singularly gain, making the 
return on cooperation less meaningful, and partly because large 
groups may have substantial organization costs that have to be 
subtracted from the expected benefits. Most importantly, Olson 
maintains that any rational egoist would choose to free ride on large 
group endeavors, and thus assuming, as he did, that selfish egoism 
is widespread, there would be insufficient effort within the group 
to generate the collective good. However, Olson contends that 
relatively small groups might be able to sustain cooperation, because 
if a person tries to free ride in a small group, it is more noticeable, 
and it is thus easier to identify and punish the culprit.
Although almost at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum to 
Olson, Ostrom (1990) concurs that prosocial actions are more likely 
to thrive at a smaller, more localized level. Ostrom’s work provides 
some support for the above conjecture, where she finds that in 
common pool resource situations—for example, establishing local 
fishing rights—collectively desirable outcomes arise when users are 
left to develop the rules and enforcement mechanisms themselves. 
In short, Ostrom contends that communities often develop their 
own cooperative, reciprocal rules without enforcement from the 
central state and without imposing private property rights. She 
also believes that prosocial norms, which may have developed from 
prosocial actions that evolved organically, play an important role in 
tackling common pool resource challenges. For instance, when there 
are strong shared norms against opportunistic behavior, people will 
be less worried about the dangers of defection, and this can reduce 
the costs of monitoring and sanctioning activities.
Ostrom thus suggests that allowing regulation from the ground up, 
driven as it often is by mutual interest, may be more effective than 
trying to impose regulation from the top-down. Ostrom writes that
It is possible that [people] learn whom to trust, what effects 
their actions will have on each other and on the CPR 
[common pool resource], and how to organize themselves to 
gain benefits and avoid harm. When individuals have lived 
in such situations for a substantial time and have developed 
shared norms and patterns of reciprocity, they possess social 
capital with which they can build institutional arrangements 
for resolving CPR dilemmas.… Public policies based on the 
notion that all CPR appropriators are helpless and must have 
rules imposed on them can destroy institutional capital that 
has been accumulated during years of experience in particular 
locations. (1990, 184)
Ostrom therefore contends that local communities will often be 
best equipped to self-regulate and manage their collective goods 
and services; she also emphasizes that the threat and application 
of a set of sanctions agreed by the local community on those 
who are tempted to or do transgress is a needed component of 
the regulations. In other words, negative reciprocity is required if 
cooperation within the group is to be sustained. Without the threat 
of punishment, selfish egoists, even if they are only small in number, 
may drive otherwise conditional cooperators to undertake less 
enlightened, short-sighted actions.
From the above, then, a plausible generally beneficial public policy 
lesson is for the organization, management, and financing of public 
sector services to be decentralized, perhaps subject to a nationally 
imposed minimum standard of service provision, with the caveat 
that the resources collected at the decentralized level would need 
to be risk-adjusted at the superregional (or national) level if equity 
of opportunity across all relevant groups is an objective. This is not 
to argue that decentralized groupings should be disconnected from 
each other; indeed, quite the contrary, if we attach importance to 
cross-regional learning. Nor is it to argue that decentralization is 
all that one requires to stir reciprocal actions. If one encourages 
egoism at the decentralized level, for example, then egoism is likely 
to prevail. It is to contend that decentralizing is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for reciprocal cooperative arrangements to be 
given the best chance of thriving.
Finally, on income and wealth concentrations, there is evidence 
that the very rich in many countries have been awarding themselves 
indefensible increases in the shares of national income over recent 
decades. In this respect, reciprocity has perhaps gone awry. As an 
illustrative example, the share of national income in the United 
States that went to the richest 1 percent of the population increased 
from 8 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2015 (Pinker 2018); others 
have estimated the share of net wealth, as opposed to income, 
enjoyed by the top 1 percent at closer to 40 percent in the United 
States in 2014 and at 20 percent to 30 percent in an array of other 
countries, including Japan, France, Canada, Greece, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Credit Suisse 2014). 
Even if more or less everyone in society saw their income and wealth 
increase over time, one can easily be made to feel poorer if others 
appear to have so much more. When a nation’s income or wealth 
is being concentrated increasingly in the hands of a relatively small 
number of people, the majority, or at least a substantial minority, 
may have quite legitimate feelings that they are being left behind. 
A degree of inequality may be a driver of growth; it may be good 
for the group as a whole. But too much inequality may undermine 
motivation and other-regarding, group-oriented social norms and 
might crowd in selfish egoism and its consequent long-term harms.
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Widening income inequality is not conducive to sustaining a trusting, 
reciprocal, cooperative society. As Sapolsky notes, “Trust requires 
reciprocity, and reciprocity requires equality, whereas hierarchy is about 
domination and asymmetry” (2017, 292). But we must remember 
that reciprocity is a two-way street. Redistributive mechanisms may 
be easier to sustain if those who are in receipt of welfare benefits, for 
instance, are, if they are able, seen to contribute to the fabric of society. 
For example, streets, parks, and rivers can be tidied, and loneliness, 
which is a significant problem, particularly among the elderly, can be 
alleviated. Tasks that help address these issues, and many others that 
might also serve to improve skills, could be performed on a part-time 
basis by many of those in receipt of welfare benefits.
Although it may be unpalatable to some, humans are not naturally 
pure altruists. If we have a situation in which the non-poor feel that 
the poor are doing little to alleviate their situation or are offering 
little in return for assistance, then the non-poor will perhaps feel less 
inclined to help them. It might well be that in such circumstances 
the working poor and those in the middle of the income distribution 
feel squeezed the most, seeing the very rich sail away from them and 
yet feeling that they are subsidizing those who choose welfare over 
work. To effectively sustain support for a public policy or an adequate 
system of welfare, it is wise to emphasize to those who are paying for 
it what they are getting out of it, and requiring those who benefit to 
offer something tangible in return (assuming that they are mentally 
and physically able to do so) would be one way of doing that.
Nurturing reciprocity through policy rhetoric, decentralizing 
decision-making and addressing excessive income and wealth 
concentrations maintains for most the great autonomy required for 
people to pursue their privately held conception of a flourishing 
life. With great autonomy, and without counteracting measures, 
there remains considerable opportunity for egoists to act on their 
instincts. The liberal economic tradition, at least as represented by 
Mill ([1859] 1972) and his famous harm principle, recognizes this 
unfortunate potential and allows the regulation of private actions 
if those actions are imposing harms—or negative externalities—on 
others. Mill did not, however, recognize explicitly that an individual 
or organization would use the behavioral influences such as present 
bias, loss aversion, and so on, to essentially, and often covertly, 
impose harms on others.
It can perhaps be contended that a key feature of the liberal 
economic tradition—the market—by fostering reciprocity, can 
render mute the biasing potential of the behavioral influences, but 
for more than a century, the private marketing industry has shown 
that this is not the case. George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, in 
their book Phishing for Phools (2015), reveal that in certain sectors, 
these activities remain rife, can undermine mutual self-interest, 
and hence can negatively affect the opportunity to flourish for at 
least one party to the exchange. Therefore, regulation against these 
behaviorally informed harms might be warranted.
Budging Phishing
Behaviorally informed regulation, applications of which are called 
“budges” (Oliver 2013, 2015, 2017), is an alternative conceptual 
behavioral public policy approach to the forms of paternalism 
discussed earlier. There are two main types of budges: (1) regulating 
against behaviorally informed activities that impose harms on others 
Liberty 
Internalities Externalities 
Regulatory 
Behavioral 
Rational 
Pure budge 
Figure 2 The Requirements of Behavioral Regulation
and (2) regulating for behaviorally informed activities that generate 
benefits for others. Both are focused on the effects experienced by 
those other than those who are targeted for behavior change and 
thus differ from the internalities perspective of the nudge approach.
As an example of the first type of budge, consider the marketing 
divisions of confectionary companies, which through long 
experience know that salience and immediacy (i.e., present-ness) 
can have a large effect on consumer buying patterns, and thus 
they have traditionally paid supermarkets to have their products 
displayed at child eye-level near checkout counters. If we conclude 
that consumers purchase more confectionary than they otherwise 
would—and indeed, more than is good for them (and their 
children)—as a consequence, then policy makers would have an 
intellectual justification for regulating against this activity. Indeed, 
some policy makers appear to be embracing this approach, at least 
implicitly. In the summer of 2018, for instance, the Secretary of 
State for Health in England announced plans to ban the sale of 
confectionary and fatty snacks near supermarket checkout counters, 
and to introduce tighter regulations on television and online 
advertising of junk food.
In relation to the second type of budge, consider human inertia—
so-called status quo bias—and its potential to sometimes prevent 
others from realizing benefits because of lack of action by a first 
party. This may occur, for example, when people do not opt in to 
be organ donors in countries that require such action, not because 
they do not want to but because they do not get around to doing so. 
The budge here, then, may be to regulate openly so as to move the 
country to either presumed consent or prompted choice—such that 
people have to choose whether to register or not when renewing 
their vehicle tax—for organ donor registration.
Budges, like nudges, can be placed in a three-dimensional space, 
as depicted in figure 2. Compared with figure 1, the vertical and 
horizontal axes have been inverted, such that a policy placed at 
the origin would now be a regulation, informed by behavioral 
economics, to tackle an externality. That would be a pure budge.
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Countless examples of potentially harm-reducing and benefit-
enhancing budges could be offered here, but space constraints allow 
for only a couple of illustrative examples. Resembling the issue 
of putting confectionary at checkout counters, supermarkets are 
often financially induced to place alcoholic beverages at the end 
of shopping aisles, since it is known that this salient positioning 
increases sales. Indeed, it has been estimated that this positioning 
increases alcohol sales by as much as would be realized by a price 
reduction of 4 percent to 9 percent (Nakamura et al. 2014). If it 
was broadly concluded that the end-of-aisle placement of alcoholic 
products was manipulating people’s choices such that the egoistic 
self-interest of supermarkets and the drinks industry was imposing 
harms (by provoking too much alcohol purchasing and consuming) 
on consumers vis-à-vis the consumers’ perceptions of what it means 
to live a flourishing life—that is, that it had damaged a mutually 
beneficial reciprocal exchange—then there would be grounds for 
regulating against this practice. Such a regulation would be an 
explicit behaviorally informed intervention to lessen potential 
harms—in other words, it would be a budge.
As of this writing, public authorities in England appear to be 
implicitly embracing behavioral regulation with respect to the 
gambling industry, an aspect of human activity that is ripe for 
exploiting behavioral affects. Indeed, people may sometimes 
gamble almost entirely because of the behavioral influences, in 
that they may overweight the probability of winning and anchor 
on the jackpot. Of course, responsible gambling may enrich 
the lives of many people, but the exploitation of the behavioral 
influences has the potential to inflict serious harms with respect to 
many conceptions of a flourishing life, particularly for financially 
vulnerable people. Fixed-odds betting terminals (e.g., roulette 
machines) that are readily accessible in betting shops on high 
streets are one way in which the gambling industry profits from 
its knowledge of these influences. In England, these machines are 
programmed to allow people to gamble large amounts of money—
up to £100 every 20 seconds. The government has woken up to the 
harms that this can cause and has announced that in 2019 it will 
introduce regulations to limit the stake (in each 20-second period) 
that the machines will be able to accept to £2, a proposal that 
provoked considerable opposition from the gambling industry.
However, regulatory authorities might not always have to do battle 
with industry for the latter to limit (or reverse) any harms that they 
impose. In the spirit of reciprocity, it may sometimes be possible 
for public policy makers to work with those they might otherwise 
budge, by emphasizing that there may be reputational, and hence 
commercial, benefits for those who agree more readily to alter their 
practices, although history suggests that extending this goodwill all the 
way toward agreeing to industry self-regulation might best be avoided.
Conclusion
To date, the principal overarching normative goal of behavioral 
public policy in the academic and public policy discourses has 
been a paternalistic focus on moving internalities toward some 
conception of utility maximization, exemplified by the nudge 
approach. It is postulated in this article that in the spirit of the 
liberal economic tradition, or at least that associated with John 
Stuart Mill, there is a more appropriate normative path for 
behavioral public policy to follow. This relatively new public policy 
approach should seek to foster reciprocity and cooperation so 
that people are better equipped to flourish and give meaning and 
fulfillment to their lives in the ways that they see fit—which can 
include, but is not limited to, seeking personal happiness.
However, the approach proposed here goes further than liberal 
economics typically does by recognizing that allowing people 
great freedom to seek their own goals potentially affords more 
opportunities for the egoistically inclined to use the behavioral 
influences to manipulate, and impose harms on, others. Therefore, 
it is suggested that when these behavioral influences, including 
present bias, loss aversion, probability weighting, and even 
reciprocity (etc.), are being used toward self-serving, externally 
harmful ends, then there is a legitimate intellectual justification for 
regulating against those harms—in short, to budge against these 
activities. It also suggests that the actions (or lack thereof ) of those 
who are subject to behavioral affects, such as status quo bias, who as 
a consequence deprive others of substantial potential benefits, can 
be regulated to realize these benefits, provided that the regulation 
imposes no substantial costs on those who are regulated.
Thus, in one sentence, the behavioral public policy framework 
proposed here is for policy makers to secure a behaviorally informed 
environment that is conducive to helping people to flourish on their 
own terms and to regulate against and for behaviorally informed 
externalities. No claim is made that this approach will liberate all 
untapped potential or solve all of society’s ills—no approach to 
behavioral public policy (or indeed any public policy) can do that. 
But in facilitating flourishing and impacting upon externalities, this, 
to me, offers the most promising political economy of behavioral 
public policy.
Notes
1. The approach that I present in this article is closer to that offered by Mill than 
that postulated by the Austrian School of liberal economics because, like Mill 
(only, as stated, more so), I attach particular emphasis to the legitimacy of 
government regulation against harms. Leaders of the Austrian School, such as 
Ludwig von Mises ([1927] 2005), disparaged Mill’s interventionist approach, 
labeling him a socialist, although Friedrich Hayek ([1944] 2001) appeared to 
have a healthy respect for Mill.
2. The references given on the gestalt characteristics are indicative. They do not, of 
course, prove that the gestalts influence behavior substantively in all 
circumstances, and there may be an element of publication bias, in that the 
authors of studies that do not demonstrate these effects might find it difficult to 
publish their findings. Moreover, although there is additional evidence on these 
characteristics over and above that which is cited in this article, further studies 
are, of course, needed to more accurately assess the reach of the gestalts; however, 
there is sufficient evidence reported on the gestalts to lend force to the belief that 
they will often have an impact on people’s retrospective and prospective 
assessments of experiences.
3. Sigmoidoscopy is a procedure in which a flexible tube is inserted in a patient’s 
rectum to examine the colon; lithotripsy breaks up kidney stones into small 
pieces using ultrasound waves.
4. Sugden uses the term “the view from nowhere” pejoratively to indicate that the 
notion that the same normative standard should be imposed on all people is 
contestable. If one allows people to pursue the lives that they want to live as they 
see fit in their private actions—that is, to follow their own conception of a 
flourishing or meaningful life, which allows them to pursue happiness or even a 
life that others may think lacks meaning if they so wish—then no view is 
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imposed on them. There is no omnipresent view from nowhere. However, in 
public sectors—such as health, education, and so on—there will be many 
broadly agreed-upon goals, although these are still not imposed from nowhere as 
they have been decided upon following a period of open explicit debate; these 
public sector objectives (e.g., good health, knowledge, etc.) are partly intended 
to help each individual in his or her private pursuit of a flourishing life.
5. As a fundamental motivator of human behavior, reciprocity can also be used to 
inform the design of interventions that fall under behavioral public policy 
frameworks that differ from the one that I am proposing here, including 
libertarian paternalism.
6. It is important to keep in mind that a budge is a behaviorally informed regulation 
to address a harm or an otherwise forgone benefit. Nudges are non-regulatory 
behavioral informed interventions that address internalities. Moving from opting 
in to presumed consent or prompted choice for organ donation more closely fits 
the criteria of the former than the latter, yet these interventions are frequently 
mischaracterized as nudges in the literature. Oliver (2015) highlights that many 
interventions that have been proposed and/or applied as nudges are in fact more 
closely aligned with the parameters of budging.
7. In the economics literature, externalities refer to harms and benefits experienced 
by third parties to an exchange. In budge policy, the externalities can refer to the 
same (so long as the externalities are caused by actions influenced by behavioral 
phenomena) but are also extended to harms and forgone benefits that a first 
party can impose on a second party through a behaviorally influenced action or 
lack of action.
8. There may occasionally be circumstances in which it is legitimate to regulate for a 
behavioral informed measure to secure benefits for others even when the 
intervention imposes substantial costs on the regulated party, particularly if the 
regulated party sells products that are associated with harms as well as benefits. For 
example, a government may require food manufacturers to place behavioral 
informed messages and symbols on its products in an attempt to facilitate healthier 
food purchases by consumers, even if the labeling is costly to the industry.
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